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NO LONGER PLAYING NEVILS ADVOCATE: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONSTRICTS 
APPELLATE REVIEW FOR INSUFFICIENCY 
OF EVIDENCE CLAIMS 
Abstract: On March 19, 2010, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Nevils held that a reviewing court hearing criminal 
appeals on the grounds of insufficient evidence must resolve all factual con-
flicts in favor of the prosecution and ask only if any rational juror could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision 
makes it more difficult for the Ninth Circuit to reverse criminal convictions 
and ultimately preserves the jury’s proper role as the trier of fact. 
Introduction 
 Earl Nevils was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms 
and ammunition, and he appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.1 He argued that the government did not 
present enough evidence that he knowingly possessed firearms and 
ammunition.2 Agreeing with Nevils, a divided panel found that there 
was insufficient evidence that he had possessed the weapons knowingly, 
and it reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a judgment of 
acquittal (Nevils I ).3 Shortly after the panel’s decision, the U.S. Su-
preme Court heard arguments in McDaniel v. Brown, a case in which the 
Ninth Circuit had affirmed the granting of a habeas petition due to 
insufficient evidence.4 Finding “ample” evidence of guilt, the Court in 
McDaniel reversed the Ninth Circuit in January 2010.5 After the Su-
preme Court heard arguments in McDaniel, the Ninth Circuit reheard 
Nevils’s case en banc, and then following the Court’s decision in 
McDaniel, the en banc court ruled in Nevils’s case that the government 
presented sufficient evidence and affirmed his conviction (Nevils II ).6 
The conflicting conclusions of the panel and en banc court stem from 
                                                                                                                      
1 United States v. Nevils (Nevils I ), 548 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2008). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 811. 
4 130 S. Ct. 665, 675 (2010). 
5 Id. at 665, 675. 
6 United States v. Nevils (Nevils II ), 598 F.3d 1158, 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010). 
97 
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different applications of the same legal standard for insufficiency of 
evidence.7 Which application a court chooses will drastically impact the 
roles for juries and appellate courts in future appeals.8 
 Part I of this Comment narrates Nevils’s crime and follows its jour-
ney through the legal system.9 Part II examines how the Ninth Circuit 
panel and en banc court reached different conclusions from supposedly 
the same legal standard and examines the divergent effects of each.10 
Finally, Part III explores the policy interests in this debate and argues 
that for reasons philosophical, practical, and constitutional, it is wise to 
limit an appellate court’s role in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence.11 
I. Nevils’s Arrest and Appeals 
 The Nevils I panel and the Nevils II en banc court both stated essen-
tially the same facts.12 On the night of April 14, 2003, Officers Jason De 
La Cova and Jason Clauss of the Los Angeles Police Department fol-
lowed a suspect into an apartment complex in a high-crime neighbor-
hood of south Los Angeles.13 Upon entering the complex, the officers 
encountered an unlocked apartment, which the man whom they were 
pursuing had considered entering.14 
 Inside, the officers saw, alone and asleep on a couch, the defen-
dant Earl Nevils.15 A loaded Tec-9 semi-automatic weapon with a round 
chambered sat on his lap, and a .40-caliber handgun, also loaded, also 
with a round chambered, leaned against his right leg.16 Only a foot 
from the couch was “a coffee table, laden with marijuana packaged for 
sale, ecstasy, over $500 in cash, and a cell-phone.”17 Weapons drawn, 
Officers De La Cova and Clauss swept the room and approached 
Nevils.18 As they drew near, he awoke and, according to the testimony 
of Officer Clauss, “appeared like he was going to, you know, grab to-
wards his lap and then he stopped and put his hands up.”19 Officer De 
                                                                                                                      
7 See id. at 1170; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 811. 
8 See Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1170; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 811. 
9 See infra notes 12–47 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 48–99 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 100–118 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 13–25 and accompanying text. 
13 United States v. Nevils (Nevils II ), 598 F.3d 1158, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2010). 




18 United States v. Nevils (Nevils I ), 548 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 2008). 
19 Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1162. 
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La Cova, however, mentioned no such pause, instead testifying that the 
events were “almost immediate” and that Nevils “jumped up as a star-
tled jump and rolled over onto the ground.”20 After his arrest, Nevils 
told a police sergeant: “I don’t believe this shit. Those motherfuckers 
left me sleeping and didn’t wake me.”21 
 Although Nevils was only booked on the charge of possession of 
marijuana for sale, he was eventually charged, tried and convicted in 
federal court on a single count of being a felon in possession of fire-
arms and ammunition.22 The crime has three elements: “(1) that the 
defendant was a convicted felon; (2) that the defendant was in knowing 
possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm was in or affecting in-
terstate commerce.”23 Nevils twice sought acquittal due to insufficient 
evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.24 Both motions 
were denied.25 
 Following his conviction, Nevils appealed to the Ninth Circuit.26 
The Nevils I panel stated, “We review the entire record, ‘[v]iewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government,’ and ‘must de-
termine whether any rational jury could have found [the defendant] 
guilty of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”27 The 
panel acknowledged that it “must presume that the trier of fact re-
solved any conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution.”28 
 Nevils argued that he could not have knowingly possessed the 
weapons for three reasons: (1) he was asleep when the police arrived; 
(2) he had become drunk earlier in the day; and (3) there was no evi-
dence tying him to the firearms or other items in the apartment besides 
his presence in the room.29 In contrast, the government emphasized: 
(1) Nevils was in “actual possession” of the firearms because they were 
touching him; (2) a prior arrest in the same apartment shortly before 
this incident tied him to the location; (3) his gang affiliation supported 
the jury’s finding; (4) one officer testified that Nevils had reached for 
                                                                                                                      
20 Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 804. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 804–05; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 805. 
24 Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 805. Rule 29 provides for a motion for acquittal if the court be-
lieves that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction; the defendant can move for 
acquittal before or after submission to the jury. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. 
25 Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 805. 
26 Id. at 803. 
27 Id. at 805 (quoting United States v. Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 
2007)). 
28 Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 229 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
29 Id. 
100 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
his lap; and (5) his statements to the sergeant after his arrest showed 
“consciousness of guilt.”30 
 The Nevils I panel focused on Nevils’s first argument.31 Rejecting 
the “tenuous distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘constructive’ possession,” 
the panel vigorously asserted that knowing possession cannot be proved 
by “mere proximity.”32 Thus the panel’s inquiry into possession “re-
quire[d] a showing that Nevils had knowledge of the firearms and the 
ability and intention to control them.”33 The fact that the two firearms, 
each loaded, each with a round chambered, were touching him became 
less significant.34 The “close physical proximity of the guns to Nevils” 
was disregarded as “the special circumstance” of Nevils’s case.35 The 
panel decided that “the pivotal circumstance” was that “Nevils was 
slee
onviction due to in-
ffi
                                                                                                                     
a p.”36 
 Because the inquiry focused on his knowing possession and wheth-
er he could “control” the firearms, the panel held, “[T]he fact that the 
firearms were physically touching him is not sufficient to show that he 
was conscious of their presence . . . .”37 The physical contact tended “to 
make knowing possession more likely, but without evidence that Nevils 
was aware of [the weapons’] presence, this fact [was] not enough.”38 
Consequently, the Nevils I panel reversed Nevils’s c
su cient evidence as to his knowing possession.39 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion in McDaniel v. 
Brown on January 11, 2010 cast doubt upon the soundness of Nevils I.40 
Regarding the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Jackson standard, dis-
cussed more fully in Part II, the Supreme Court in McDaniel wrote, 
“The Court of Appeals acknowledged that it must review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, but the court’s recitation 
of inconsistencies in the testimony shows it failed to do that.”41 An 
open approach to the evidence, like the one criticized in McDaniel, ex-
 
30 Id. at 805, 808, 808–09 
31 Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 807. 
32 Id. at 806; see also United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1459 (9th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that mere proximity, presence and association are insufficient to prove possession). 
33 Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 806. 
34 See Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1162; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 806. 
35 See Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 808. 
36 Id. at 807. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 811. 
40 See 130 S. Ct. 665, 667, 673 (2010); Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1167. 
41 130 S. Ct. at 673. For an introduction to the Jackson standard, see infra notes 49–63 
and accompanying text. 
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pands an appellate court’s role because it will inevitably cause the ap-
pellate court to consider questions traditionally reserved for the trier of 
fact, such as “resolv[ing] conflicts in the testimony, . . . weigh[ing] the 
evidence, and . . . draw[ing] reasonable inferences from basic facts to 
ultimate facts.”42 The Nevils I panel attempted to expand the appellate 
court’s role in a fashion similar to the Ninth Circuit decision reversed 
in McDaniel.43 Although the Court in McDaniel referred to a different 
Ninth Circuit decision and a separate set of facts, there is little doubt 
that the McDaniel decision strongly influenced the en banc rehearing of 
evi
le doubt that 
Nevils had knowledge of the weapons in his possession.”47 
II. The Conf f Jackson in  
an-
dard as the Nevils II court, but reached an entirely different result.50 
     
N ls’s case, decided only two months later on March 19, 2010.44 
 On rehearing, the en banc court went through a short and 
straightforward narrative of the evidence, as the government had ar-
gued it in Nevils I.45 The court then held that “[t]his evidence, con-
strued in favor of the government, raises the reasonable inference that 
Nevils was stationed in Apartment 6 and armed with two loaded fire-
arms in order to protect the drugs and cash in the apartment when he 
fell asleep on his watch.”46 Having made this inference, the court con-
cluded that “a rational juror could find beyond a reasonab
licting Applications o
Nevils I and Nevils II 
 The key difference between the Nevils I panel and the Nevils II 
court lies in their application of the standard of appellate review.48 
Both agreed that the standard laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1979 decision in Jackson v. Virginia governed Nevils’s insufficiency of 
evidence claim.49 Thus the troubling question is how the Nevils I panel 
examined essentially the same facts and employed the same legal st
                                                                                                                 
42 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
43 Compare Brown v. Farwell, 525 F.3d 787, 796–98 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding inconsisten-
cies .3d at 806–10, 811 
(con versing conviction). 
73; Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1158, 1167. 




 in the trial record and reversing conviction), with Nevils I, 548 F
sidering alternative inferences from the evidence and re
44 See McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 6
45 See Nevils II
46 Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1169. 
47 Id. 
48 See United States v. Nevils (Nevils II ), 598 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010); Un
es v. Nevils (Nevils I ), 548 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2008). 
49 See 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1161; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 805. 
50 See Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1170; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 811. Technically, Nevils I quoted 
not Jackson, but United States v. Esquivel-Ortega and United States v. Johnson. United States v. 
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 Both cases are governed by the standard set forth in Jackson.51 In 
Jackson, the Supreme Court held that when reviewing an insufficiency of 
evidence claim, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”52 Embedded within that holding are two critical steps.53 
First, the court must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the 
government.54 Second, the court must ask whether “any rational trier of 
fact” with such a view of the evidence could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.55 A court does not ask “whether it 
believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.”56 Even if certain inferences are possible and even if the 
prosecution’s inference does not affirmatively appear in the record, a 
reviewing court must assume that the “trier of fact resolved any such 
conflicts in favor of the prosecution.”57 The test is designed to place the 
responsibility for determining all facts in the hands of the trier of fact.58 
                                                                                                                     
 Before Jackson, the standard set forth in Thompson v. Louisville, a 
1960 U.S. Supreme Court case, governed insufficiency of evidence 
claims.59 In Thompson, the Court held that a conviction based on no 
evidence whatsoever would be constitutionally problematic.60 Eighteen 
years later in Jackson, the Court found that this “‘no evidence’ rule” was 
“simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitu-
tional standard of reasonable doubt” because even a “mere modicum” 
of relevant evidence could uphold a conviction.61 If any amount of evi-
dence, no matter how small, could satisfy the Thompson standard, it was 
obviously divorced from any relation to reasonable doubt.62 Although 
the Jackson standard may seem to favor the government disproportion-
 
Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 229 F.3d 
891, 894 (9th Cir. 2000). The language quoted from these cases, however, was almost iden-
tical to Jackson, and for the reader’s ease, the “Jackson standard” is referred to when discuss-
ing the legal standard used in Nevils I. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
51 Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1164; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 805. 
52 443 U.S. at 319. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (citation omitted). 
57 Id. at 326. 
58 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
59 Id. at 314; Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 199, 206 (1960). 
60 362 U.S. at 206. 
61 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964) (War-
ren, C.J., dissenting)). 
62 See id. 
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ately, it in fact increased protection from convictions based on insuffi-
cient evidence by focusing the inquiry on reasonable doubt.63 
 The court in Nevils I did not exactly apply the Jackson standard, but 
rather a modified version of Jackson found in the 1992 Ninth Circuit 
case United States v. Vasquez-Chan.64 In Vasquez-Chan, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the defendants’ convictions for conspiracy to possess with in-
tent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine because the court 
determined that the proof was “based in large part on their mere prox-
imity to the drugs,” which was a “legally insufficient basis for a rational 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they were guilty 
. . . .”65 Although Vasquez-Chan used the language of Jackson, the Nevils I 
panel used Vasquez-Chan to create a different standard than that set 
forth in Jackson: “When there is an innocent explanation for a defen-
dant’s conduct as well as one that suggests that the defendant was en-
gaged in wrongdoing, the government must produce evidence that 
would allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the latter explanation is the correct one.”66 Using this standard, the 
Nevils I panel, without giving a possible innocent explanation, held that 
Nevils’s “‘mere presence’ and gang affiliation” did not constitute suffi-
cient evidence for a rational jury to infer knowing possession beyond a 
reasonable doubt.67 This ultimate conclusion did not rely on language 
from Jackson, which is mostly deferential to the government, but rather 
on the “innocent explanation” rule of Vasquez-Chan, which imposed a 
new burden on the government not found in Jackson.68 
 Judge Jay Bybee’s spirited dissent in Nevils I attacked the majority’s 
problematic approach to Jackson.69 He emphasized that the burden im-
posed by Jackson is “extraordinarily high,” that “ample circumstantial 
evidence” supported the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that any explanation other than guilt was “extraordinarily implausi-
ble.”70 Judge Bybee posited two possible “innocent explanations” im-
plied by the court’s decision.71 The first was that Nevils, drunk and 
                                                                                                                      
63 See id. at 319. 
64 See Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 810, 811; United States v. Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546, 549 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
65 978 F.2d at 546, 553. 
66 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 810 (quoting Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 
at 549). 
67 548 F.3d at 811. 
68 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 810, 811. 
69 See Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 811–15 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 812. 
71 See id. at 812–13. 
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asleep, was brought into Apartment 6.72 Then, somehow without waking 
Nevils, one or more unknown persons entered Apartment 6 with cash, 
drugs packaged for sale, a cell phone and two loaded firearms, each 
with a round chambered.73 The persons decided to leave the firearms 
on top of and against the still-sleeping, still-drunk Nevils, along with 
items of enormous value next to him.74 The second theory is that the 
drug dealers abandoned all of these items on purpose.75 As Bybee de-
scribed it: “[T]hey set up a scarecrow of sorts—arming the unconscious 
Nevils and propping him up on the couch to look menacing. This plan, 
of course, was foiled by the arrival of the police, who weren’t impressed 
with the sleeping Nevils.”76 Because the majority did not specify any pos-
sible innocent explanations, it could not directly answer the dissent’s 
characterization of the possibilities.77 For Bybee, the absurdity of these 
innocent explanations demonstrated that a reasonable juror in fact 
could have found Nevils guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.78 That con-
clusion would mean that the government had satisfied the Jackson stan-
dard and that the Nevils I panel should have affirmed the conviction.79 
Bybee’s dissent proved prescient because he criticized the same misap-
plication of Jackson corrected by McDaniel v. Brown and Nevils II.80 
 In the Ninth Circuit’s en banc rehearing of Nevils’s case, the peni-
tent court recited facts almost identical to those of Nevils I, though it 
mentioned the chambered round, a detail that had only appeared in 
Judge Bybee’s dissent in Nevils I.81 The Jackson standard was quoted 
again, but gone was the emphasis on “mere proximity” and the new 
duty from Vasquez-Chan that an innocent explanation required the gov-
ernment to prove that the guilty, and not the innocent, explanation was 
correct.82 In fact, the court emphasized that the government did not 
need to “rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”83 Unlike the Nevils I panel, the Nevils II court would 
not second-guess the jury’s assessment of the testimony of Nevils’s 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 813. 
74 Id. 
75 Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 813 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 804–11 (majority opinion). 
78 See id. at 814 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
79 See id. 
80 See McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2010); Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1167; Nevils I, 
548 F.3d at 811–15 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
81 Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1162; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 804, 811. 
82 See Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1161; Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 806, 810. 
83 Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1164. 
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companion that he had entered the apartment without any firearms 
and was asleep until the police arrived.84 Although the government 
presented no evidence that contradicted that claim, the jury was free to 
disbelieve the witness, and Jackson forbade the appellate court from as-
sessing a witness’s credibility.85 Thus on rehearing, the Nevils II court 
did not examine her credibility and assumed that the jury did not be-
lieve her testimony.86 This deferential approach demonstrates the 
court’s embrace of McDaniel and rejection of the Nevils I panel’s appli-
ca n of Jackson.tio
not grapple in the 
                                                                                                                     
87 
 To support its interpretation of the Jackson standard, the Nevils II 
court cited the policy proposition in Jackson that “a court of appeals 
may not usurp the role of the finder of fact.”88 Additionally, the court 
emphasized that the reviewing court “may not ask whether it believes 
that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”89 The court plainly expressed that it now understood Jackson to 
impose a high standard and that the court ought 
dark for possible holes in the government’s proof.90 
 The Nevils II court recognized that the Ninth Circuit “[has] strug-
gled with the correct approach to construing evidence at trial.”91 In-
deed, the court said it had “strayed from [its] obligation under step one 
of the Jackson standard to construe the evidence at trial in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution.”92 The Nevils II court traced this mu-
tation of the Jackson standard back to United States v. Bishop, in which the 
Ninth Circuit in 1992 considered “the evidence in favor of an innocent 
explanation” and then determined whether that explanation was 
“equally or more reasonable than the government’s incriminating ex-
planation.”93 In light of McDaniel, the Nevils II court then reviewed oth-
er cases that followed Bishop and overruled all cases, including Vasquez-
Chan, that construed evidence in favor of innocence rather than in fa-
 
807. 
, 548 F.3d at 811. 
 F.3d at 1164. 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
ates v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 830 (9th Cir. 1992). 
84 Id. at 1169–70; see Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 804–05, 
85 Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1170. 
86 See id. at 1169–70. 
87 See id. at 1168–69; Nevils I
88 Nevils II, 598
89 Id. (
90 See id. at 1165–67. 
91 Id. at 1165. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1166; see United St
106 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
vo of the prosecution, and ordered reversal if the innocent construc-
tion was as likely as the government’s.
r 
th Circuit, which restricts the appellate 
court’s role and makes reversals of convictions for insufficiency of evi-
denc
94 
 Despite purporting to apply the same legal standard, the Nevils I 
panel and Nevils II court substantively applied two different readings of 
Jackson.95 On the one hand, the Nevils I panel had loosely interpreted 
Jackson’s requirement to construe evidence in favor of the prosecution, 
continuing to question pieces of evidence and look for alternate possi-
bilities that favored innocence instead of guilt.96 On the other hand, 
the Nevils II court insisted that Jackson forbade them from such an ex-
ploration of the evidence.97 The narrowed inquiry of the Nevils II court 
favored the government because it increased the burden on Nevils to 
identify “evidence so supportive of innocence that no rational trier of 
fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”98 The court’s defer-
ential approach to the jury’s conviction of Nevils demonstrates a new 
reading of Jackson for the Nin
e much more difficult.99 
III. Insufficient Evidence Claims and the Trier of Fact’s  
Role in the Criminal Justice System 
 Appeals on the grounds of insufficient evidence demand that the 
reviewing court determine its proper role.100 Between conviction and 
appeal, the burden of proof effectively shifts from the government to 
the convicted defendant, and this recalibration largely shapes the re-
viewing court’s role.101 The meaning of “reasonable doubt” does not 
change from trial to appeal, but the Jackson standard, which controls 
appellate judges, constricts their ability to find reasonable doubt and 
reverse a conviction.102 If all evidence is viewed in favor of the prosecu-
tion, no room remains for considering alternative evidentiary interpre-
tations or information not in the trial record.103 The Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                      
94 Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1167; see, e.g. United States v. Corral-Gastelum, 240 F.3d 1181, 
1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wiseman, 25 F.3d 862, 866–67 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Vasq
vils I, 548 F.3d at 811. 
. 
 F.3d at 1164. 
t 1169. 
. Ct. 665, 673 (2010). 
2, 673. 
uez-Chan, 978 F.2d at 551. 
95 See Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1170; Ne
96 See Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 810–11
97 See Nevils II, 598
98 See id. a
99 See id. 
100 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
101 See McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S
102 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
103 See McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 67
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own emphasis on “any rational trier of fact” demonstrates that this was 
not a process intended to allow frequent reversals.104 Practically, to en-
ur
s guilt or innocence and their anterior questions 
e 
ry’
             
co age finality and efficiency in the judicial system, the application of 
Jackson in Nevils II should result in fewer reversals and less time spent 
reviewing appeals in the Ninth Circuit.105 
 Beyond practical considerations, there is also a jurisprudential ra-
tionale for narrowly reviewing appeals for insufficient evidence.106 The 
determination of guilt is made by a jury.107 The Constitution guaran-
tees the right to a jury for all criminal trials.108 There is still a role for 
appellate courts, but the trier of fact, the trial judge, and the appellate 
court each perform only the task for which each is best suited.109 The 
trier of fact determine
of fact, like weighing evidence or determining a witness’s credibility, 
and the appellate court stands ready to correct any errors of law that 
may have been made at trial.110 
 The Nevils I panel likely did not believe it was usurping the role of 
the trier of fact.111 One could argue that the court actually made a deci-
sion of law because it only applied the legal standard to the established 
facts.112 That argument would be sophistic, however, because the appli-
cation of the legal standard to the facts implies the weighing of evidence 
and the creation of a narrative.113 Applying the legal standard, given to 
the jury by the trial judge, to those factual conclusions is essentially th
ju s key duty.114 Any interference with that process disrupts the jury’s 
role in the criminal justice system. Therefore, the standard to reverse a 
conviction due to insufficient evidence should be difficult to satisfy.115 
 When the reviewing court attempts to sort out the facts of an en-
tire trial, it can only look at strands of evidence and cannot easily inter-
pret the evidence as a whole or determine the importance and credibil-
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ity of testimony.116 For example, the majority in Nevils I became so fix-
ated on Nevils’s slumber and the testimony of a single witness of dubi-
ous credibility that it ignored the tremendous amounts of circumstan-
tial and direct evidence tying Nevils to the crime.117 I
reserved for th
lowed the jury to make inferences from the evidence.118 
Conclusion 
 The Nevils I panel and the en banc court that reheard the case in 
Nevils II both considered the sufficiency of evidence of the petitioner’s 
conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. 
Both cases employed the same test from Jackson v. Virginia, which called 
for the court to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the gov-
ernment and then ask whether any rational trier of fact could have 
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. After the first 
hearing of the petitioner’s case, the Nevils I panel decided that the evi-
dence could not survive such an inquiry because an innocent explana-
tion was possible, but the en banc rehearing determined that there had 
been sufficient evidence. The majority in Nevils I erred because it 
usurped the role of the trier of fact. By selectively examining the evi-
dence and positing alternate scenarios, the panel not only failed to fol-
low Jackson but also abandoned its duty to correct only errors of law and 
encroached upon the jury’s role as trier of fact. Fortunately, the en 
banc court fixed this error. Although a deferential review of the evi-
on the whole, preserve 
sition to judge the evi-th
d
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117 See Nevils I, 548 F.3d at 812 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
118 See Nevils II, 598 F.3d at 1170. 
